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Abstract — Focus of this paper is on ethical issues related to
the era of Internet, e.g. cyberethics. Approach used in this
paper is phenomenology, whereas definitions of cyberethics
are discussed from the viewpoint of pragmatic ethics, while
questioning existing basic values in society and proportion
these into pragmatic, de facto ideology. Resulting comparison
provides conceptual analysis on cyberethics as well as
provides new perspectives on research on cyberethics. This
paper demonstrates, that there exists a conflict between
pragmatic and general moral law, which is foundational one.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper focuses on ethical issues closely related to the
era of Internet, e.g. cyberethics. In this paper the authors a)
provide a definition of cyberethics from the viewpoint of
pragmatic ethics, and b) discuss certain basic values
(democracy, freedom of speech, equity) and proportion
these into pragmatic, de facto ideology. Resulting
comparison will provide following contributions; a)
conceptual analysis on cyberethics and b) new perspectives
on cyberethics research.
Methodologically this study is phenomenological one.
According to Gilles Deleuze, philosophy is needed
especially in situations, where new phenomena already
exist, and both concepts and words are swaming in space. It
is philosophy’s duty to clarify situation [1]. This study
accepts the challenge proposed by Deleuze (as well as Félix
Guattari) – after all, virtual reality is one metaphor for
dimension like space. Phenomenological bracketing was
chosen as a research method particularly because of “being
behindhand” [2]. In phenomenology central concepts or
phenomena are taken into consideration from different
perspectives. It is quite obvious that for example concept
“digital divide” has a number of meanings depending on
chosen discipline, or viewpoint. In phenomenological
reduction attempt to define significance and discipline
becomes a systematic attempt on controlling chaos [3].
Defining the cyberethics is a cross-disciplinary project.
Topic is related to such concepts as internet ethics, self
regulation, game theory, plagiarism, trust and privacy,
digital divide, professional ethics, surveillance and
regulations related to freedom of speech, to name a few.
These are very common topics in publications concentrated
on internet ethics [4]-[8].
According to pragmatism, values are being tested all the
time with reality [9]. This is to say that pragmatism does
not accept any permanent values, and therefore it is suitable
for describing virtual ethics and reality. Usually
development in value hierarchies is slow, but sometimes it

is surprisingly fast [10]. Pragmatism is also based on
scientific optimism [11], where it can be said that pragmatic
ethics reflects advances in IT.
There is a common principle that applies on both Internet
and information technology in general. As soon as a new
technology is being introduced, everyone is eager to utilize
it as soon as possible. There are no significant attempts in
creating standards to follow, but instead solutions created
by one vendor will quite soon become “de facto standards”.
Application is being accepted by general public without
being defined and accepted officially, because this would
take too much time.
Similar de facto –practice appears to exist in moral issues
related to Internet. Moral codes are being molded and
introduced taking only pragmatic issues into account.
Actors are everything but professionals. A new moral is
being created in Internet all the time; new virtual
communities are being born all the time, and these form
rules and practices, which depart greatly from commonly
accepted ethical codes in society. From ethical viewpoint
this phenomenon is interesting – it appears that everything
is happening faster in Internet [12]. Pragmatism is suitable
way for describing the development of Internet, all de facto
practices, which are being measured based on their
suitability alone. Likewise, the concept of self regulation is
more than applicable with pragmatic ethics.
Self regulation creates ethical codes while at the same
time influences existing regulations, norms taking shape.
This type of action is very Hobbesian by nature. There
exists pragmatic de facto ideology behind self regulation. A
justified question stated is: what basic values self regulation
takes into account and which it chooses to ignore? One
could argue that binding moral values into consequences of
actions is basically simplifying ethics. Ethics, which studies
consequences (pragmatism, de facto), aims to be able to
estimate and evaluate consequences of actions. Thus
everything is measured in money (or by effectiviness).
When considering possible consequences of action and
compatibility with existing moral law, for example violence
provided by Internet does not gain amnesty – even in cases
where a proof about caused damages can not be given [13].
In this study authors analyze chosen basic values
(democracy, freedom of speech, equity) and proportion
these to pragmatic de facto ideology. As a result, this study
provides a comparison which illuminates a) basic concepts
in detail, and b) opens new perspectives for research in
cyberethics. Authors will demonstrate that there exists a
conflict between pragmatic and general moral law, which is
foundational one. Explanatory power of pragmatism is
greater though.
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II. METHOD
Phenomenology can be called eidetics, which means that
it is possible with the assistance of the eidetic reduction to
reach the essence of the things and phenomena [14]. In his
earlier studies Edmund Husserl (The Idea of
Phenomenology) [15] claims that the universal is seen in
the individual. The move from the individual intuition to
the grasp of the universal is a move to grasp the essence.
Husserl calls this “method” eidetic intuition. Husserl
believed that it was possible to have an insight into the
essential nature of things. He argued that these essences
could be seen in a manner analogous to perceptual seeing
of a physical object [16]. This eidetic seeing is what
Husserl calls seeing essence or essential seeing.
The traditional phenomenological method turns
problematic when cyberethics is defined. In our opinion
cyberethics is not a concept or an idea but an ongoing
dynamic process that is almost impossible to grasp by
means of a model, for instance. Things that are changing
irregularly all the time can be handled in the same way as
Zeno tried to deny the motion. In his aporia or paradox
about the arrow that never gets to the target Zeno claimed
that at any point in time a moving object must be at rest
[17]. That’s how the models are constructed, they require
an infinite amount of “rest positions”, whereas we suppose
that cyberethics is an entity that is changing all the time.
How is it possible then to define such a phenomenon? We
need to take an ontological standpoint. We don’t ask what
cyberethics is but how it is. The crucial question is how
cyberethics exists?
When defining cyberethics we are not trying to gain the
essence of the concept but the meaning of it. As E. D.
Hirsch states, an interpretive hypothesis is ultimately a
probability judgement that is supported by evidence [18].
When defining cyberethics, the researchers are actually
interpreting the society and the cultural strata of it. We are
in the middle of the life flow all the time, which means that
we are only able to understand the factual reality, in other
words we are commuting between two existential
categories, the actual projects and the factual reality. [19] [20]. When an individual is interpreting his own life, he is
actually moving in the same way as the life itself. Husserl
calls the life-world the ultimate horizon of all human
achievement. As conscious beings the individuals always
inhabit the life-world. It is pregiven in advance and
experienced as a unity. It is the general structure that allows
objectivity.
We are in the life-world and at the same time we are
interpreting a particular area of it, i.e. the virtual reality and
the values – the cyberethics. The results of our research
depend on the standpoints that we have taken – in practice
it is impossible to occupy all the possible viewpoints.
That’s why we have to be content with the probability in
our research – we aspire to give an account of the
cyberethics as it is seen in this phase of our culture and
civilization. The result of the phenomenological project is
always the insight of the phenomenon and the description
of this insight.

III. THE ETERNAL RETURN IN CYBERETHICS –
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The history of mankind is filled with myths of eternal
return (Spengler, Nietzsche, Antics, Christianity etc.). But
it is not only in mythology and fairy tales that this theme is
constantly repeated. It is possible to find the same model in
science, too. In his book The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962) Thomas Kuhn presents the idea that
science does not progress via a linear accumulation of new
knowledge, but instead undergoes periodic revolutions
which he calls "paradigm shifts", in which the nature of
scientific inquiry within a particular field is abruptly
transformed [21]. The paradigmatic shifts are preceded by
periods of stagnation. The progress of science, as Kuhn
describes it, can be seen in a circular way, the scientific
revolution always returns, it had to take place.
The same phenomenon can be seen in the products of all
creative activities. The creative periods are always followed
by stagnation and institutionalization. The corresponding
development is to be discerned in all social, cultural and
technical phenomena – and in the arts [22]. Many of the
cultural structures and phenomena can be seen and
described with the help of the eternal return (repetition)
[23].
The same concerns the Internet. Upon the introduction of
Internet, many pioneers of the information age had high
hopes for it. Maybe the Internet didn’t fulfil those
expectations. People were talking about increased
democracy and freedom, better possibilities in all social
participation and communication and so forth, basically
about about the democratic values. Jürgen Habermas says
in his theory of discourse ethics that there is a
communicative void in the society. The more people and
institutions communicate in a society, the more efficiently
democracy is working. [24] The Internet should fill this
communicative void. This also means that the Internet
could be socially valuable, positive value. But the Internet
is constantly changing; it is a dynamic communication
environment. According to Habermas the bourgeoisie,
when it had taken the power, began immediately to work up
the public sphere, where communication takes place, in the
favour of its own interests. There prevails only one truth in
that kind of society. The Internet, on the contrary,
represents pluralism, competition between different
opinions and genuine free public debate [25].Economical
interest, commercialism and the commercial media threaten
free communication. According to Habermas these do not
belong to the area of free communication, nor do the
administrative organisations. In the early days of the
Internet there was no commercialism and as little
administration as possible. Lee Salter, a Habermas
researcher, says that the Internet grows apart all the time
from those ideals of free communication which were so
typical of it in the beginning. The government uses the
Internet more and more for administrative and
propagandistic aims, and they are trying to use the Internet
as a means to control citizens. The ideal of Internet
communication was interactivity in the beginning, whereas
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communication has recently become more and more onesided or non-communicative. [26] Deborah G. Johnson
claims that commercial interests have all the time
increasing their influence on the development of the
Internet. This is based on the fact that free market forces
have realized that the Internet is an important and efficient
tool and media [27] and have taken over it.
Democracy was one of the great ideals in the pioneering
times of the Internet. (Yoneji Masuda and the computopia,
1972) [28]. Like other positive values it was like an
impetus or a driving force that put the Internet’s
development in motion. But as it is with all the ideals and
beautiful values, they do not flourish in reality. Many on
the NSMs (New social movements) make use of the
Internet when communicating. Internet is cheap, fast,
interactive and offers possibilities to anonymity. But these
movements that operate underground or outside the control
of the society are often organisationally antidemocratic.
[29] So it is possible to see the model of the eternal return
here, too. It means the fall of free, progressive forces and
the victory of institutionalization and stagnation.
The faster the Internet and ICT are growing and
developing, the better has become the methods of
controlling the citizens. Panopticon, Michel Foucault’s allembracing metaphor telling about and describing the
official horror and terror, has finally been realized [30]. At
the same time when the Internet makes the communication
between individuals run smoothly, it gives the public
administration and terrorists (hackers etc.) a comparable
and as efficient a tool to supervise and sort people, to
invade citizens’ privacy. With the assistance of figure and
face recognition it is possible to pick up persons from an
anonymous mass and build up their virtual identities that
has little to do with the real personae. Is the effective way
of controlling people valuable in one way or the other? Of
course, if we think of the public administration,
bureaucracy and all the overseeing authorities (the police,
the customs, security services or tax authorities), the
efficient monitoring is a useful phenomenon. [31] The
question is about the balance between privacy and thrust.
The more the public takes over the area of personal
privacy, the more the citizens feel anxious and defend
against the intrusion [32]. But at the same time the area of
free communication is threatened. Here the freedom and
effectiveness are fighting against each other. When
defining the valuable, we must decide which viewpoint we
choose – this is one of the main questions in
phenomenology. Are we obliged to take a stand? Are we
going to evaluate the effectiveness from the point of view
of the authorities, or are we going to take a stand on
citizens’ favor? It is here, where the question about
different ethical theories comes along.
IV. PRAGMATISM AND DE FACTO ETHICS
Is pragmatism the best possible ethical theory suitable
for
cyberethics?
Pragmatism
explains
technical
development and progress in moral well but when justice is
taken into account, pragmatism is not the best possible

explanatory model. Pragmatism emphasizes the importance
of activity in human life. Pihlström says that although the
scientific worldview would not be the best possible (to the
mankind), we can make the world a better place to live in
through our active work [33]. In addition to optimism
William James’s and John Dewey’s pragmatism
emphasized development and change, that is why it suits
well the world of information technology. According to
pragmatism, values are being tested all the time with reality
[34]. This is to say that pragmatism does not accept any
permanent values, and therefore it is suitable for describing
virtual ethics and reality. The norms exist in relation to the
surroundings, they are context bound. The individual
reactions against the value hierarchy can change it. Usually
development in value hierarchies is slow, but sometimes it
is surprisingly fast.
The moral action is not only the adaptation of moral
rules, because the moral principles are suppositions or
hypothesis, which have to be tested constantly. They must
fulfill certain qualifications or requirements and they are
open for changes. When we test moral rules we also
interpret them. Legal system and legislation are good
examples: The judges not only adapt the law but they also
interpret it because they so often had to do with precedents
without applications.
According to pragmatism things don’t have any values,
they are value neutral. After all, pragmatism accepts value
hierarchy. But this hierarchy is not a permanent one. Why
don’t we think likewise about the Internet? It is possible to
measure the usefulness of the Internet and we can call the
result of the measurement the utility of the Internet. Now
we are very near consequentialism, which, as its name
suggests, is the view where normative properties depend
only on consequences. This general approach can be
applied on different levels to different normative properties
of different kinds of things, but the most prominent
example is consequentialism about the moral rightness of
acts, which claims that whether an act is morally right
depends only on the consequences of that act or of
something related to that act, such as the motive behind the
act or a general rule requiring acts of the same kind.
The pragmatic moral bound to consequences is an easy
way to describe the Internet and the fast technological
advance. Many of the traditional pragmatists agree on the
idea that everything, also the moral arguments, can be
measured. The argument “Violence is unethical” can be
tested as well as any other proposition.
Immanuel Kant argued that moral requirements are based
on a standard of rationality. Kant called this rule the
Categorical Imperative. It is one of the main clauses of the
deontological normative ethical theory. According to Kant
we are acting in a certain way because we have different
kinds of duties towards ourselves and others. This may
appear strange to the adherent of pragmatism.
Edmund Husserl held an interesting lecture on ethics in
Vienna in 1935. [35] The highest ethical goal of the
rational culture and civilization is its spontaneous and selfsteered improvement. In the same way as a rational
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individual is able to evaluate and study his practical goals,
so can a whole culture. European (or western) culture is
therefore able to direct its future itself. According to
Husserl there are ideal absolute goals, as well as ethical,
that can never be gained or fulfilled totally, but they are
something worth aiming at. Here Husserl comes near
Immanuel Kant’s regulative principle. These aims and the
relationship of the European civilization to these goals can
be evaluated over and over again, and this is the strength of
the rational European civilization. Edmund Husserl doesn’t
name precisely what these goals may be, but it is highly
probable that the idea of equality could be among these
definitive aims. [36] As T. Miettinen states, equality in a
society can’t be described quantitatively or geometrically.
Nevertheless, we understand what it means. We are able to
evaluate our activity in proportion to this goal even though
we can never achieve it. Although it is out of our reach, it
determines our activities and choice. [37] This means that
we are trying to achieve equality, for instance, over and
over again. This project originates (socially) from French
Revolution in 1789 and is still going on. The original
Internet enterprise (ARPANET) in the 1970s was based on
this kind of noble ideals (democracy, equality, noncommercialism, free speech and communication), but as
Deborah Johnson stated, these pioneering dreams have
been crushed. Control has taken over and because of
commercialism there is no democracy, equality or area for
free communication, to put it simply [38]. However, these
goals or absolute ideals do still exist and are waiting for the
new evaluation, as Husserl said. Husserl speaks about
reappraisal and new beginning, but on a very universal
level.
Pragmatism is based on so called de facto ethics, and it
easily neglects values like democracy and equality. Profit,
surplus, effective use of time, logistics, effectiveness, price
and usefulness are some of the “values” typical of the de
facto pragmatism. But it is not so simple. If pragmatists get
an assignment that consists of the development of Internet
democracy, they certainly accomplish it, without thinking
of the meaning of the word democracy. According to
Husserl, the civilization is in crisis when the pragmatic
science dominates. To solve this crisis Husserl invites
rational thinking [39].
How to define de facto pragmatism? In the introduction
we compared it with de facto standards. As soon as a new
technology is being introduced, everyone is eager to utilize
it as soon as possible. There are no significant attempts to
create standards that should be followed, but instead, the
solutions created by one vendor will quite soon become “de
facto standards”. Application is being accepted by general
public without being defined and accepted officially,
because this would take too much time.
Similar de facto –practice appears to exist in moral issues
related to the Internet. Moral codes are being molded and
taken into use taking only pragmatic issues into account.
Actors are everything but professional. A new moral is
being created in the Internet all the time; new virtual
communities are being born all the time, and these form

rules and practices, which differ greatly from commonly
accepted ethical codes in the society. From the ethical
viewpoint this phenomenon is interesting – it appears that
everything is happening faster in the Internet.
There are many causes behind this de facto practice.
Husserl would say that it depends on the triumphal march
of the applied sciences. Deborah Johnson would probably
say that the American domination in the Internet is the main
cause (Pragmatism has always been American philosophy).
We think there are other reasons, too. Attitude education
has certainly good possibilities to clarify the ethical
background of the Internet. It is certainly necessary,
because we all want to be sure that the Internet is going to
be working smoothly in the future, and a fair, righteous and
democratic Internet is reality. But because of the times we
are living in, some of the typical Internet principles
(anonymity) and the internationalization/globalization, are
not that easy to carry out in reality.
V. SELF-REGULATION AS A HOBBESIAN
ENTERPRISE
European Union has started a project, where great
emphasis is on the encouragement for self-regulation of the
Internet. The Safer Internet plus programme aims at
promoting safer use of the Internet and new online
technologies, particularly for children, and at fighting
against illegal contents and contents unwanted by the enduser, as part of a coherent approach by the European
Union. [40]
Behind self-regulation is a desire to promote the
functioning of the same set of values and professional
ethics. S. Visala states that when the Internet crossed the
borders of the scientific community and became a
commercial and civic enterprise, the whole gamut of human
activities and interests came along. Money, flaming,
plagiarism, copying of data files etc. finished the well
working self-regulation. [41]
A classical example of self-regulation is the Leviathan of
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679). Hobbes described the
society that had plunged into anarchy. In such a society the
inhabitants can’t predict or make plans for the future.
Unable to rely indefinitely on their individual powers in the
effort to secure livelihood and contentment, Hobbes
supposed, human beings join together in the formation of a
commonwealth. Thus, the commonwealth as a whole
embodies a network of associated contracts and provides
for the highest form of social organization. On Hobbes's
view, the formation of the commonwealth creates a new,
artificial person (the Leviathan) to whom all responsibility
for social order and public welfare is entrusted. [42]
Leviathan was written during the English Civil War; much
of the book is occupied with demonstrating the necessity of
a strong central authority to avoid the evil of discord and
civil war. The war or anarchy can be compared with the
Internet, where there is are executive or legislative bodies.
Patricia Wallace has stated that the Internet and the cooperative groups work effectively and without quarrel or
contradictions, if they are homogenous [43]. In this respect
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the Internet is full of paradoxes. Globalization shrinks the
world and spreads the Internet, but simultaneously the
amount of potential troublemakers increases [44].
The Safer Internet project has listed ways to increase the
functioning of the Internet with the help of self-regulation.
There are certainly many technical devices. But the most
important way to improve the working of the net is to
increase education and enlightenment. This will also
improve self-regulation [45].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious that the principles of virtual ethics
(cyberethics) can be drawn from traditional ethics. On the
other hand, according to the idea presented by Intona [46],
electronic mediation is inducing a sense of hyperreality into
our world, thus vitiating our ethical sense of being. Then
again, Hobbesian Leviathan tells us how the development
from an anarchistic state goes on voluntarily towards
working operational environments. Here the acquired
benefit is bigger than the other values, such as freedom,
excitement or possibility to make big and quick profits.
There are some special features which are typical for the
Internet, which may inhibit the development of solid
sustainable ethical code. One of these characteristics is the
fast growth and the hectic nature of the Internet. This is
why the concept of de facto ethics is so well suited to
describe the real ethical meaning of cyberethics – or is it
better to call it a non-ethical theory (a theory that describes
practical activity) that defines only technical, goal-oriented
activity or goal rationality.
According to Beck [47], the social production of wealth
systematically goes hand in hand with the social production
of risks. According to him [48], risks and the potential of
self-threat have been unleashed on a hitherto unprecedented
scale as a consequence of the exponential growth in the
forces of production as the process of modernization
continues. This is a place for a well founded question: How
can ethical discussion take place, when the consequences
of possible risks are well beyond comprehension? Husserl
explains convincingly how the ethical principles in a
community “ought” to work. Husserl’s observer, or
scientist (philosopher), is situated in the middle of the life
flow, bound to the historicity and lifeworlds, and somehow
he is able to outline the ethical condition of the culture.
Husserl’s idea that we have to redeem our ethical goals
over and over again can be seen as a well-defined comment
against pragmatism and de facto ethics.
De facto ethics and pragmatism don’t operate on the
same level with traditional ethics or ethical code. There are
no distinct and unquestionable principles in pragmatism;
efficiency, usability and fastness can be seen as one of the
main criteria to the activity of good quality (valuable). But
it might be so that sometimes it would be useful to study
the ethical foundations of all the activities in a society.
Husserl’s ideas bring ethical content to the non-ethical
environments.
Husserl’s idea about the revaluation of ethical code,
goals that had to be evaluated over and over again, is based

on the idea of western rationality, but it certainly conflicts
with the ideas of freedom in the different sectors of the
society. De facto ethics explains the factual situation in a
society that is getting more and more technical all the time.
Self-regulation on the other side is a typical way of trying
to get the Internet function. Because of Internet’s
voluntarily character that has not always been very
successful. Many of the different self-regulation projects
(The Safer Internet project, information literacy, rules of
the computer games) have improved the functionality of at
least some of the Internet environments. In self-regulation
we can see some kind of eternal return to the times when
the pioneer spirit of the Internet was dominant.
De facto ethics makes it possible to describe the factual
ethical situation in the Internet; traditional ethics tells us
how it should or could be. If we give priority to values like
freedom, democracy and equality, there is certainly a big
difference between the factual situation and the absolute
ideas (ideals, natural values, as described in traditional
ethics). The problem in this kind of evaluation is the
definition of the absolute values which is important in
quantitative research and is called operationalisation: in
ethics it is extremely difficult to answer the question “How
do I measure what I am interested in studying?”.
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